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ABSTRACT
We present a framework for determining the information that can be extracted from stock prices
around takeover contests.  In only two types of cases is it theoretically possible to use stock price
movements to infer bidder overpayment and relative synergies.  The takeover contest for Paramount
in 1994 illustrates one of these generic cases.  We estimate that Viacom, the “winning” bidder,
overpaid for Paramount by more than $2 billion.  This occurred despite the fact that Viacom’s CEO
owned roughly 3/4 of Viacom.  These results are consistent with managerial overconfidence and/or







University of Chicago Graduate School of Business
1101 East 58
th Street







New York, NY  10027  1 
 
  When a merger is announced, three different pieces of information affect the stock prices of the 
target and bidder.  The announcement reveals information about the potential synergies arising from the 
combination, the stand-alone value of the firms involved in the merger, and, how the value will be split 
between the target and the bidder(s).  In general, it is not possible to distinguish among these three effects 
in a particular takeover contest.  For example, if the announcement reveals favorable (unfavorable) 
information about the target and bidder, the combined change in bidder and target stock values will 
exceed (not exceed) the synergies arising from the merger.
1  Similarly, if the bid reveals favorable 
(unfavorable) news about the stand-alone value of the bidder, the change in bidder stock value will 
overstate (understate) the benefit of the transaction to the bidder.
2   
This paper develops and applies a classification scheme that identifies those situations in which it 
is potentially possible to disentangle the sources of price changes.  In the first part of the paper, we 
identify two generic cases in which synergy, overpayment, and information effects can be disentangled to 
solve for the estimated overpayment by the bidder.  One occurs when the acquisition is not consummated; 
the other occurs when the acquisition is a takeover contest that includes exactly two bidders.  We also 
discuss the additional (information) conditions that must be satisfied in practice to be able to disentangle 
the different effects.  Even among the generic cases we identify, we point out that most takeovers will not 
satisfy the necessary conditions. 
In the second part of this paper, we analyze the takeover contest for Paramount that began in the 
fall of 1993 and ended in the winter of 1994.  This contest (1) is representative of one of the generic cases 
and (2) comes close to satisfying the required information conditions.  The Paramount contest involved 
exactly two bidders:  QVC, led by Barry Diller; and Viacom, led by Sumner Redstone.   The unusual 
structure of the contest allows us to estimate bidder overpayments, relative synergies, and information 
effects.   
                                                                 
1 See, for example, Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), Jensen and Ruback (1983), and Roll (1986). 
2 For example, offers financed by the bidder's stock may signal that the stock is over-valued (Franks, Harris, and 
Titman (1991)).   2 
We use our framework to calculate that the market estimated that Viacom, the eventual “winner" 
of the takeover battle, overpaid by more than $2 billion when it agreed to purchase Paramount in a $9.2 
billion acquisition in February 1994.  The market estimates appear to be reliable in that market prices did 
not revert in the three years following the acquisition.  This overpayment occurred despite the fact that 
Sumner Redstone, the CEO of Viacom, owned more than 75% of the Viacom’s cash flow and voting 
rights.      
These results have two possible (and not mutually exclusive) interpretations.  The first is that 
Redstone’s beliefs were very different from those of the market.  The unwillingness to revise those beliefs 
in light of the market reaction is strongly consistent with the argument in Roll (1986) that “bidding firms 
infected by hubris simply pay too much for their targets,” as well as papers that stress managerial 
overconfidence such as Heaton (2002) and Malmendier and Tate (2002). 
 The second interpretation is that Redstone received large private (and non-pecuniary) benefits 
from the acquisition.  Perhaps he wanted to be the “king of all media.”  This is strongly consistent with 
theories in which private benefits drive managerial decision making over and above pecuniary incentives.  
The important point here is that neither interpretation is consistent with the traditional agency or incentive 
problem because Redstone controlled such a large fraction of Viacom’s cash flow rights.  Our analysis 
indicates that the combination of hubris and private benefits exceeded $1.5 billion.   
This paper contributes to a large literature in corporate finance that studies the information and 
value effects of mergers.  That literature is too large to survey here.
3  The papers closest to ours are 
Bhagat, Hirshleifer and Noah (2001), Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002), and Schurman (1999).  
Bhagat et al. (2001) estimate overpayments and synergies using movements in the bidder’s and target's 
stock prices around an intervening offer from another firm.  They identify their empirical analysis by 
using ex post data (the sample average) to estimate the ex ante probabilities of success for initial and 
subsequent bidders and the expected price that a winning bidder will have to pay.  With these 
assumptions, they find that acquisitions are expected to be value increasing overall, but that bidders do   3 
not gain on average.   Fuller et al. (2002) estimate bidder returns for frequent or serial acquirers.  They 
argue that this reduces the amount of information about the bidder that is revealed in any particular 
acquisition.  Schurman (1999) uses a related intervention technique to estimate proposed overpayments in 
acquisitions that were rejected by anti-trust authorities.  Consistent with our results, he finds that bidders 
who suffer losses at takeover announcements do so primarily due to overpayment.  Our empirical analysis 
differs from those in those papers in that we obtain direct estimates of overpayment and relative synergies 
for one particular transaction. 
Our paper also illustrates the issues raised by Bebchuk and Hart (2001) who present a model to 
study the relationship between pre-voting market prices and shareholder tender and voting decisions in 
control contests. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I introduces the symbols and definitions used throughout 
the paper, and sets up the basic problem that we study.  Section II derives those generic takeover 
situations in which it is potentially possible to estimate how much the bidder overpays for the target.  We 
also discuss the additional conditions necessary to generate these estimates.  Section III presents the 
clinical analysis of the paper.  We detail the sequence of events that led to the Paramount auction, and 
analyze the market reactions to developments as they occurred.  Section IV applies the methodology from 
sections I and II to the Paramount takeover contest, and solves for the market’s estimates of the two 
bidders' information effects, overpayments and relative synergies with Paramount.  Section V concludes. 
 
I..  The Analytical Framework 
In this section, we analyze generic acquisition contests between N potential acquirers and one 
target.  Let the acquirers be denoted by A, B, C,..., the target, T.  To simplify the analysis, we describe a 
takeover contest with four distinct points in time:  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 For a recent survey, see Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001).   4 
•  Time 0 denotes a time before the takeover contest has started. The market prices of the potential acquirers and 
the target reflect the market's estimates of the companies stand alone values without any information about the 
coming takeover contest. 
•  Time 1 denotes the time when the takeover contest begins by at least one of the potential acquirers submitting 
an initial bid. The market prices of the potential acquirers and the target reflect the new information in a manner 
consistent with the market's consensus.  In our analysis we do not use these prices. 
•  Time 2 denotes the time when all the potential acquirers have submitted their final offers (or, more importantly 
what the market believes are the final offers). We assume that the market prices at this point reflect (a) the 
market's valuations of different possible combinations, (b) the market's updated stand-alone valuations of 
individual companies (updated for the information possibly revealed by the various bids) and (c) the market's 
assessments of the winning probabilities for each bid (denoted q
I
t for firm I). W will consider the case in which 
the sum of the winning probabilities is one as well as the case in which the sum is less than one. 
•  Time 3 denotes when the board of directors (or the shareholders) announces the outcome of the contest. As 
mentioned above, we will consider the case in which the outcome has to be an acquisition by one of the 
acquirers as well as the case in which it is possible that the board announces that the takeover contest is over 
and the target will continue to operate independently. 
Market values at time 3 reflect the final outcome and are denoted as follows. Let I
J represent the 
value of firm I if firm J wins control of the target, T. For instance, A
A, B
B, C
C, …, denote the value of the 
particular acquirer if it is the winner of the takeover contest. These values reflect the market's estimates of 
the synergies, readjusted stand-alone values, as well as the winner's final offer.  Likewise, A
B represents 




N, ..., and T
N, represent the market values of firms A, B, C, ..., T, if no 
acquisition takes place. These values reflect the market's updated stand-alone values of the firms. Finally, 
the target's market value in the case of a successful acquisition by firm I is denoted O
I(I
I). For example, 
O
A(A
A) refers to the value of acquirer A's final offer, which can be a function of the acquirer's share price 
if the offer includes securities of the acquirer. 
   5 
A.  Defining the Sources of Value Change 
We can now define the market's estimates of the synergies in the acquisition, the overpayment by 
the acquirer, and the information revealed about the stand-alone values of the various acquirers and the 
target.  Assume that firm A ultimately wins control of the target. Then the total value change accruing to 
the successful bidder and target is [A
A-A0] + [O
A-T0], which can be rewritten as: 










Each of the four bracketed terms on the right-hand side of equation 0 carries a distinct 
interpretation. These can be summarized as follows: 





(1B)  New information about A as standalone:     [A
N - A0]  
(1C)  New information revealed about target:       [T
N - T0]  
 
  Overpayment by the acquirer also can be measured as one part of the synergies: 
 




In addition, each unsuccessful firm, I, experiences a total value change equaling  
(1E)  New information revealed about acquirer, I:    [I
N- I0] 
These terms can seldom be estimated separately.  While the total value change is typically 
observable in completed acquisitions, there is usually not enough information to disentangle the value 
change into distinct components.   For example, if the takeover is successful, then we do not observe A
N, 
the value of firm A as a stand-alone.  Without A
N, we cannot calculate exact overpayments, nor can we 
calculate the value change due to new information revealed.  The only information revelation we witness 
is that which concerns the unsuccessful bidders. 
In the section 2.2, we use the link between present stock prices and expected future cash flows to 
set up a framework for inferring distinct sources of value change.  Then, in section 3, we discuss various 
takeover scenarios and describe when this framework yields inferences of overpayments, synergies, and 
information revelation. 
   6 
B.  Identifying the Sources of Value Change 
Because stock prices are (discounted) expected values of future cash flows, we can establish a 
system of equations that link market values at time 2 to the observed and unobserved market values at 
time 3.  This link is the key to identifying situations in which the various components of Equation (1) can 
be uncovered.  Arranging the market values and success probabilities of the firms involved in the 
takeover contest according to the set of potential outcomes, we can write stock prices as follows: 
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where E2 is the expectation at time 2 of time 3 variables; q
I
2 is firm i's success probability at time 
2; q
N
2 is the probability that the target remains a stand-alone firm as of time 2; and W2 denotes the 
market's time 2 information about time 3 values.  In matrix form, this system of equations is:  
(5)  P2   =   E2 (P3q2|W2), 
  
where P3 is the matrix obtained from time 3 firm values in equations (2)-(4) and P2 is the column-
vector of current stock prices for each of the firms involved in the takeover contest.
4  Equation (5) is the 
key to disentangling overpayments, synergy, and information revelations.   It relates current stock prices 
to assessments of future market values and success probabilities for each firm involved in the takeover 
situation.  At time 2, for N acquirers and one target, equation (5) is a system of N+1 equations in (N+1)
2 + 
(N+1) unknowns, since all of the q
I, and the I
J are unobservable ex ante.
5 
At time 3, we either see N unsuccessful bidders and the stand-alone value of the target, T
N, or else 
we see one successful firm and N-1 unsuccessful ones, but not the stand-alone value of the target. Thus, it 
is never possible to separate stock price changes into three distinct sources.  Our solution to this problem 
is to use time 3 observed values as proxies for the market's expectations at time 2.  Then, in some 
situations, we can solve equation (1) for the unobservable data.  For example, suppose that firm A 
                                                                 
4 We ignore expected returns because the time horizons in question are generally small.   7 
successfully acquires the target T. This means that we observe A
A, O(A
A), and the stand-alone values of 
the losers-B
N, C
N, and the others.  Equation (5) becomes: 
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where figures in bold denote observed values.  Depending on the number of bidders involved in 
the acquisition contest, and the amount of information about future outcomes that is known in advance, it 
is sometimes possible to take the proxies that we have inserted into Equation (5) and use them to back out 
the remaining, unobserved values.  In the next section we pinpoint the situations in which observed values 
can be used to disentangle the total value change in the acquisitions into its constituent parts.  We also 
discuss whether it is reasonable to use time 3 values as proxies for the market’s expectations of those 
values at time 2. 
 
II.  When Can Information Be Extracted?  
In this section, we analyze and classify takeover situations based on how much information can 
be extracted from stock prices during a takeover contest.  In general, there are too few ex ante restrictions 
and ex post observables to be able to solve Equation (5) for synergies and overpayments.  However, as 
Table 1 summarizes, there are two situations in which inferences are possible: (i) when a takeover battle 
between two bidders and one target occurs and the market knows in advance that one will win with 
certainty; and (ii) when a failed takeover attempt by a single bidder occurs. 
The first step is to make assumptions that limit the number of distinct firm values one has to 
estimate.  In terms of Equation (5), we assume that, for all distinct firms I and J,  I
J = I
N.  In other words, 
if firm B is unsuccessful in the takeover, then the identity of the winning bidder has no impact on the 
value of firm B – losing the contest to one firm is no different from losing the contest to another firm.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
5 The number of unknowns is so large because the P matrix need not be symmetric. Later we simplify the analysis 
by assuming that it is symmetric.   8 
This assumption is potentially inappropriate in situations in which two firms in the same industry are 
bidding for a target that, if acquired, would give one firm a market advantage over the other.
6  There are 
two reasons why we still make this assumption.  Most importantly, it simplifies our analysis, but does not 
affect our results – the assumption is irrelevant for the two circumstances in which inferences are 
possible.  In addition, the evidence in Eckbo ((1985) and (1992)) suggests that the assumption is 
reasonable.   He studies the stock price reactions to rival firms when a merger is announced and finds that 
rival firms earn essentially zero abnormal returns. Although he does not focus explicitly on losing parties 
in a merger transaction, his evidence suggests that this assumption seems reasonable for our purposes, 
since it suggests that the market value of neighboring firms to a merger is unaffected by the merger 
outcome. 
This assumption reduces the number of bidder stock prices in Equation (5) from (n+1)
2 to 2n+2.
7  
Ex ante, none of these are visible, but at time 3, n+1 stock prices are revealed, leaving n+1 stock prices 
and n+1 probabilities to be calculated. 
We divide the takeover situations into two categories based on market beliefs at time 2, (that is, at 
the point in time when the final bids have been made but the final outcome is not yet known). The 
categories are: 
•  Category I:  Takeover situations in which the market knows at time 2 that one of the bidders will take over the 
target.  That is, the winning probabilities sum to one, and this information is known at time 2. 
•  Category II: Takeover situations in which the market believes at time 2 that there is a positive probability that 
the target will not accept any of the bids but will continue as an independent stand-alone company. That is, the 
sum of the winning probabilities is strictly less than one. 
 
In Category I, the ex ante information about takeover probabilities works to eliminate one 
element of the q vector in equation (5), because q
N = 0.  Also, setting q
N = 0 zeros out N additional 
elements of the P3 matrix.  Empirically, we can assign a takeover situation into category I when the target 
                                                                 
6 For example, see Esty (1998). 
7 The 2n+2 unknowns comes from the fact that there are two unknowns per firm, and there are are n+1 firms.   9 
has put itself “on play" or organizes an auction among the potential acquirers.  A more typical takeover 
situation would be assigned to category II. 
Ex post (at time 3), we can further divide category II takeover situations into two subcategories 
based on the final outcome: 
•  Category II-A:  Takeover situations in category II in which the final outcome is that the target is taken over by 
one of the bidders. 
•  Category II-B: Takeover situations in category II in which the final outcome is that the target stays independent. 
 
Ex post information further shapes the P3 matrix from equation (5).   Depending on the number of 
firms involved in the takeover, we can sometimes obtain solutions of all the variables in question, thereby 
enabling us to determine stand-alone values, synergies, and overpayments.  In the following three 
subsections, we analyze the categories separately to determine the takeover situations where we can 
disentangle either the total value change in the acquisition or the total value change in the acquirer's 
market valuation. 
 
A.  Information Extraction in Category I  
In this category, we know in advance (at time 2) that one of the bidders will take over the target at 
time 3.  We can further divide the takeovers in this category by the number of bidders. 
  A.1  N=1 
  This is a trivial case where we have a sole bidder that will acquire the target with 
complete certainty. In this case we cannot isolate any of the total value changes as T2 = O
A(A
A) and A2 = 
A
A.
8  Thus, we cannot solve for information effects, overpayment, or synergies since we cannot observe 
(or solve for) A
N and T
N. 
  A.2  N=2 
In this case, the stock prices at time 2 reflect the market estimates of q
A, A
A, and B
B (at time 3) in 
the following way: 
                                                                 
8 This is the original case studied by Grossman and Hart (1980).   10 
A2    =    q
A A
A + (1 - q
A) A
N  
 B2    =    q
A B
N + (1 - q
A) B
B  
 T2    =    q
A O
A(A




At time 2, we observe A2, B2, T2 and functional forms of O
A(A), and O











In this takeover situation we can estimate information effects for both acquirers (as we know A0, 
B0, A
N, and B
N), overpayment by A (as we know A
A and A
N) and the overpayment which B offered to 
make (as we know B
B and B
N). We fall short of estimating the synergies as we cannot solve for T
N in this 
case. However, since T
N is unaffected by which bidder takes over the target, we can determine whether 
the synergies would have been higher with A or B. The following numerical example illustrates this kind 
of takeover situation. 
Example 1:  Before the takeover battle starts (at time 0) we observe A0 = $72, B0 = $60, and T0=$20. 
In the end of the takeover battle, the final bids from A and B are: 
O
A(A




B)    =    10 + (1/3) B
B 
  
At time 2, the market knows that the target's board will pick one of the offers.  The market 
prices at this time point are A2 = $63, B2 = $60, and T 2 = $28.  Because Firm A's stock has dropped 
so dramatically, the board decides to accept B's offer and we observe afterwards that 
 A
N  =   $70.8 
B
B   =   $59.4 
O
B(B
B)=   $29.8.  
 
Thus we get the following three equations: 
$63   =    q
A A
A + (1 - q
A)$70.8  
$60   =    q
A B
N + (1 - q
A)$59.4  
$28   =    q
A [1/2(A
A)] + (1 - q
A)[$10 + 1/3$59.4]  
 
From these three equations we obtain:  
A
A   =   $50 
B
N   =   $61 
O
A(A
A) =   $25 
q
A  =  0.375 
                                                                 
9 As mentioned above, the assumption that A
J = A
N is not relevant here.   11 
 
Using these values, we determine that: 
 
Information  about  A      A
N - A0  =    -$  1.2  
Information  about  B      B
N - B0  =    $  1.0  
Overpayment by  A       A
N - A
A  =    $20.8  
Offered Overpayment by  B     B
N - B
B  =    $ 1.6  
 




N].  The 
market estimates: 
 
Synergies for A:  $50 - $70.8 + $25 - T
N     =  $4.2 - T
N 
Synergies for B:  $59.4 - $61 + $29.8 - T
N    =  $28.2 - T
N 
 
We can say, therefore, that the synergies with B exceed those with A by $24.  Because we do 
not observe T
N, we cannot solve for information revealed about T or for the absolute amount of 
synergies.  
 
  A.3    N > 2 
  In a general case with N acquirers, we must try to solve for N-1 probabilities and N stock 
prices with N+1 equations. This system of equations cannot be solved if N > 2, and thus the only takeover 
situation in category I which can be solved for overpayment and ‘comparative' synergies –which bidder 
adds more value –  is the case with two bidders. 
 
B.  Information Extraction in Category II-A 
In this category, there is positive probability ex ante (at time 2) that the target stays independent, 
but, in fact, at time 3, one of the bidders actually takes over the target. The fact that q
N does not equal 0 at 
time 2 means that we do not lose any of the I
N elements of the P3 matrix in Equation (5).   Furthermore, 
each of the probabilities is unknown.  This leaves N+1 stock prices and N+1 probabilities. 
As a result, we must recover N+1 stock prices and N+1 probabilities from only N+1 equations.  
No unique solution exists, and thus, there does not exist a single takeover situation in category IIA for 
which we can solve for overpayments or synergies.   12 
 
 
C.  Information Extraction in Category II-B 
In this category, there exists a positive probability at time 2 that the target stays independent; at 
time 3, we learn that the takeover attempt fails.  It is useful again to divide takeover situations in this 
category based on the number of bidders. 
  C.1  N = 1 
At time 2, with only one bidder we have two equations.  Because only one bidder is involved, a 




A + (1 - q
A)A
N   
 T2 = q
A O
A(A




At time 2, we observe A2, T2, and the functional form of O
A.   At time 3, we additionally observe 
A
N and T
N. Thus, we have two equations and two unknowns: A
A and q
A. Assuming that A
A   ?A
N, we can 
use the first equation to obtain q
A.  With this, we can use the second equation to solve for A
A.  It is worth 
stressing that this analysis requires the assumption that the expectation of A
N at time 2 is equal to A
N at 
time 3.  We discuss the validity of this assumption in section 2.D.  
In this takeover situation we can estimate information effects for both the bidder and the target, 
the proposed overpayment by A, and the synergies that would have happened had the merger occurred. 
The following numerical example illustrates this type of takeover situation. 
Example 2:  Before the takeover battle starts (at time 0), we observe A0 = 50, and T0 = $19. Firm A 
makes a final bid: O
A(A
A) = $10 + 1/3(A
A).   At time 2, the market knows that either the bid will be 
accepted by the board or the bid will be rejected and the takeover contest will be over. The market 
prices are A2 = $48 and T2 = $24. The bid fails (because of a takeover defense or anti-trust challenge) 
and the contest is over. The new prices in the market are A
N = $49 and T
N = $21. 
We solve for A
A = $47.4 and thus O
A(A
A) = $25.8.  The following information is revealed: 
 
Information about A       A
N - A0         = -$1    13 
Information about T      T
N - T0         = $2  
Offered Overpayment by A      A
N - A
A         = $1.6  





N]  = $3.2  
 
  C.2  N > 1 
The case of more than one firm in category IIB is similar to that of category IIA with more than 
two firms.  In general, with N acquirers we must find N stock prices and N probabilities with only N+1 
equations. This system is under-identified, and thus the only takeover situation in category IIB that can be 
solved for synergies and overpayments is the case of a single bidder. 
 
D.  Information assumptions 
In this section, we discuss the extent to which it is likely that the information assumptions in our 
analysis are met in practice.  The analysis has (at least) two important and nontrivial information 
requirements.  First, the analysis assumes that time 3 is a discrete time or event.  In other words, there is a 
clear date at which (1) the market knows the takeover will be consummated for Category I acquisitions; 
and (2) the market knows the takeover will not occur for Category II-B acquisitions.  Second, the analysis 
assumes that the market does not gain new information about the underlying values of the bidders, 
targets, and synergies from time 2 to time 3.  This means that we assume that the actual time 3 realized 
values of the bidders and targets are the values that the market expected at time 2.   
The first assumption that time 3 is a discrete date may not be appropriate for many Category II-B 
acquisitions.  Even if a target announces that an acquisition is out of the question or if a bidder announces 
that it is no longer pursuing the target, the market may still put a non-zero probability on the likelihood 
that the target will be taken over.  Consistent with this, Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) show that targets 
of unsuccessful bids decline in value for some period after the bid is withdrawn.  The first assumption is 
more appropriate for Category I acquisitions, particularly in those instances where the target has put itself 
up for sale.     14 
The second assumption also may be violated for both Category I and Category II-B acquisitions.  
For example, the withdrawal or defeat of a takeover bid may convey information about the bidder and the 
target, changing the values of A
N and T
N.  As a result, the expectation of A
N (or T
N) at time 2 may not 
equal the realization of A
N (or T
N) at time. 
Our analysis in the previous sections showed that there are only two types of takeover situations 
in which it is theoretically possible to extract information on synergies and overpayments from stock 
prices for a particular takeover contest.  The discussion in this section suggests that the problem is more 
difficult than this.  Even in situations in which it is theoretically possible, it may not be practically 
possible to extract the information because the necessary assumptions do not hold. 
In the next two sections, we describe the Paramount - Viacom - QVC takeover contest.  We argue 
that this contest corresponds as closely as possible to our theoretical category I contest with 2 bidders.  
This contest is particularly appropriate because it ended with a court-mandated auction that involved two 
bidders – Viacom and QVC.  The auction process had a well-defined end point at which final bids were 
due, corresponding to time 2.  At time 2, it also was virtually certain that Paramount would be sold to one 
of the two bidders.  Consistent with our first assumption, the process also had a well-defined end point at 
which the winner would be declared, corresponding to time 3.   
It is still uncertain whether the second assumption is satisfied.  Consistent with the second 
assumption, it is plausible that the market did not gain any new information about the underlying values 
of the bidders, targets, and synergies from time 2 to time 3.  The contest had been going on for almost 
five months at the time final bids were due (time 2).  Thus, while there are aspects of the contest that are 
not ideal, particularly the complexity of the Viacom offer, it is close to ideal in corresponding closely to a 
Category I contest with 2 bidders.  
If these assumptions hold, there is still one potential concern.  If no information changed from 
time 2 to time 3, and the acquisition was certain to occur, why wasn’t the winner already determined at 
time 2?  In other words, why didn’t arbitrage activity drive stock prices at time 2 to equal the prices at 
time 3?  There are at least three possible responses to this.     15 
  One explanation relies on differences in information among shareholders.  If some shareholders 
are more informed than others, the less informed shareholders will need to use share prices to infer the 
information held by the more informed.  Bebchuk and Hart (2001) analyze precisely this situation in the 
context of a control contest.  Frictions or fixed costs in becoming informed or in inferring the information 
could result in share prices not adjusting instantaneously.  (See Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2001)). 
A second explanation is that both bids were valued at roughly the same value making it very 
difficult to determine the winner at time 2. 
A third explanation is that shareholders believed it was possible that one of the bidders would 
withdraw leaving the other bidder the winner, but that it was almost a zero probability event that both 
bidders would withdraw at the same time.  
 
III.  The Paramount - Viacom - QVC Takeover Contest 
We apply the analytical apparatus developed above to the Paramount acquisition contest that 
began in summer of 1993 and culminated in a takeover auction in February, 1994.
10  This contest 
corresponds closely to category I of section 2 for which it is possible to estimate overpayments and 
relative synergies. 
Paramount, Viacom, and QVC are familiar names in the motion picture and cable television 
businesses.  At the time of the contest, Paramount produced and distributed entertainment products, 
including motion picture films, home movies, and television programming.  The “Star Trek” television 
and movie series was one of Paramount’s most valuable properties.  Martin Davis was Paramount’s CEO 
at the time of the contest.  Viacom operated a number of entertainment and communications businesses 
including several cable television networks:  MTV, VH-1, Nickelodeon, The Movie Channel, Comedy 
Central, Lifetime, FLIX, and the All News Channel.   Viacom was majority owned and controlled by its 
chairman and CEO, Sumner Redstone.  QVC, the smallest of the three companies at the time of the 
                                                                 
10 This section is based on Kaplan (1994a), Kaplan (1994b), Paramount Communications 13E3 (May 25, 1994), and 
the opinion of the Delaware Court of Chancery (1993).   16 
contest, operated the nation's largest home-shopping television network.  QVC’s CEO was Barry Diller 
who had formerly been a senior executive at Paramount and at Fox where he launched the Fox television 
network.  Diller had a strong reputation in the television and movie industries. 
Viacom made a friendly takeover offer for Paramount on September 12, 1993.  Paramount’s 
board accepted the offer and agreed to a substantial lock-up option and termination fee.  Paramount’s 
board also agreed to lift Paramount’s poison pill for the transaction.  QVC followed one week after 
Viacom’s offer with a hostile tender offer.  The tender offer did not have the support of Paramount’s 
board and, therefore, was conditional on the removal of Paramount’s poison pill.  A lengthy battle ensued 
during which both firms increased their bids for Paramount. 
Because Paramount’s board refused to consider QVC’s offer (and remove the poison pill), QVC 
sued Paramount and Viacom countersued to protect its transaction.  Ultimately, the Delaware Chancery 
Court ruled in favor of QVC.  The court required Paramount’s board to consider all offers.  Paramount's 
board responded by conducting an auction for control of the company.  In the end, Viacom won the 
auction.  
Our analysis shows that Viacom dramatically overpayed for Paramount.  In fact, based on the 
downward spiral of QVC's and Viacom's stock prices, the market consensus was that both firms were 
overpaying.  Any would-be synergies between Viacom or QVC and Paramount were dwarfed by this 
downward revision in Viacom and QVC.  In spite of the fact that both firms were overbidding, Viacom so 
overpaid for Paramount – by roughly $1.5 billion - that its offer prevailed.  In the rest of this section we 
describe these events in greater detail and study the stock price movements surrounding the merger 




A.  Viacom and Paramount Agree to a Combination   17 
On September 12, 1993, the board of directors of Paramount Communications approved the 
following transaction.  For each Paramount share, Viacom would pay (i) $9.10 in cash, (ii) 0.1 shares of 
Viacom Class A voting common stock, and (iii) 0.9 shares of Viacom Class B non-voting common stock.  
This consideration was valued at $69.14 per share based on closing stock prices on September 10.  
According to the terms of the agreement, Paramount’s CEO, Martin Davis, would manage the combined 
entity as CEO, but Viacom’s CEO, Sumner Redstone, would maintain control of roughly 70% of the 
voting shares.   
At the beginning of the week before the announcement, (on September 7), Paramount stock 
traded at $55.875 per share.  From that point, Paramount stock began to rise, reaching $61.125 on 
September 10 (the Friday before the announcement) and $64.50 on September 13 (the Monday after the 
announcement).  The market reacted unfavorably to Viacom.  From September 7 to 13, Viacom Class A 
stock fell from $66.125 per share to $64.125.  Viacom Class B stock, to which no voting rights were 
attached, declined from $59.25 to $56.75 over the same period.  On Tuesday, September 14, the Class A 
and B shares declined again, to $61.50 and $55.375 per share, respectively.  Paramount declined to 
$63.125.  The S&P 500 was essentially unchanged over the same week. 
 The share price movements imply an increase in Paramount’s value of roughly $1 billion (120 
million shares outstanding) and a decline in Viacom’s value of $0.5 billion (also 120 million A and B 
shares outstanding).  The drop in Viacom's market value implies that the market had an overall negative 
evaluation of (1) the price Viacom was paying and (2) the new information about Viacom from the bid.  
The overall gain from the transaction announcement of $0.5 billion net gain reflects the sum of synergies, 
overpayments, and new information about stand-alone values.   
As part of the offer, Paramount granted Viacom an option to purchase 23.7 million Paramount 
shares at $69.14 per share and agreed to pay a $100 million termination fee if any of three contingencies 
arose: (a) Paramount terminated the agreement because of a competing bid; (b) Paramount's shareholders 
did not approve the transaction; or (c) Paramount's Board recommended a competing bid.  Furthermore, if   18 
the option were exercised, its strike price could be paid with a combination of cash (for the par value of 
the stock, or $1 per share) and senior subordinated notes (for the remainder).
11 
 
B.  QVC Enters  
  On September 20, QVC launched a hostile bid for Paramount.  In a letter to Paramount, QVC 
proposed a business combination of Paramount and QVC under which each outstanding share of 
Paramount would receive 0.893 of a share of QVC and $30 in cash.  Before the offer, QVC closed at 
$59.50 per share implying a value of $83.13 for the offer.  QVC's bid had the support of Tele-
Communications Inc. (TCI), the country's largest cable television company.  Davis and Paramount 
responded that Viacom was a better fit, but that Paramount would potentially consider a QVC offer. 
The market's reaction to this announcement was negative; QVC’s stock price dropped $3.50 from 
$59.50 on Friday, September 17, to $56 on Monday, September 20.  Going back to September 13 (or 
September 7), the stock price drop was more severe:  QVC traded at $62.75 ($63) one week earlier (and 
one week before the announcement of the Viacom-Paramount agreement).  At $56 per share, the offer 
from QVC was valued at $80 per share ($30 cash + .893($56)).  This substantially exceeded the value of 
the Viacom offer ($63 at Viacom share prices on September 20). 
 
C.  The Takeover Battle  
On September 23, Viacom filed an anti-trust suit against QVC and TCI.  Four days later, Davis 
told his board that acceptance of the QVC offer would trigger Viacom's termination fee and lock-up 
option.  Nevertheless, the board decided to consider the QVC offer, but only if QVC could provide 
evidence of financing.
12 
                                                                 
11 A $100 million termination fee amounts to $0.83 per share. The option had the effect of requiring a rival bidder to 
pay Viacom $0.20 per share for every $1 it paid above $69.14 per share. 
12 This chronology is based on accounts in the Paramount Communications Proxy Statement, dated June 6, 1994, 
and the March 1994 Corporate Control Alert (published by American Lawyer Media, LLP.)   19 
By October 21, Paramount still had failed to enter into negotiations with QVC. Partly in response 
to Paramount's inaction, QVC, along with Paramount shareholders, filed a class action suit in the 
Delaware Court of Chancery on October 21, seeking to prevent the proposed merger between Paramount 
and Viacom and, in particular, to invalidate Viacom's option to purchase 23.7 million Paramount shares. 
The plea also asked the court to prohibit Paramount from using its stockholder rights plan (poison pill) to 
oppose QVC's bid.  
On the same day, QVC publicly announced that it would begin a tender offer for 51% of 
Paramount’s shares at $80 per share and, if successful, would propose a second-step merger in which the 
remaining shares would be converted into QVC common stock. This offer was contingent on the 
invalidation of both the poison pill and the lock-up option. Viacom responded by increasing its offer to 
the same $80 per share of Paramount.  Viacom also began a tender offer for 51% of the Paramount shares 
outstanding at a price of $80 in cash per share following which, in a second-step merger, holders of the 
remaining 49% of Paramount shares would receive a portfolio of Viacom securities, including common 
stock, preferred stock, and warrants. 
Table 2 catalogs the actions taken by Viacom and QVC as each tried to outdo one another's 
takeover proposals. This process continued throughout the autumn of 1993, until the Delaware Chancery 
Court ruled in favor of QVC on November 24.  The court's decision refined the standards for injunctive 
relief that were relevant in merger transactions. Before this ruling, several potentially conflicting 
precedents offered alternative views as to whether Paramount faced enhanced fiduciary duty in this 
situation. The court ultimately ruled that the events surrounding the Viacom merger triggered a 
heightened standard of duty, one that Paramount had not met.  As a result, the agreed-upon acquisition by 
Viacom was blocked. The court ruling also barred Paramount from using its poison pill defense against 
QVC and struck down Paramount's stock option lockup.   The ruling did uphold the $100 million 
termination fee payable to Viacom if the merger were to fail. 
The courts' ruling increased the probability that QVC would be the winning bidder.  QVC's stock 
price fell from $48.875 to $47.750.   At the same time, Viacom's A (B) shares rose from $47.750 to   20 
$50.625 ($41.75 to $44.50).  Paramount's stock price also increased from $76.25 to $80.125.  These 
reactions suggest that the market expected both QVC and Viacom to overpay if they ultimately prevailed. 
On December 9, 1993, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the Chancery Court ruling,  
effectively mandating that Paramount's board seriously consider all offers.  As a result, on December 14, 
Paramount's board dropped the merger agreement with Viacom and agreed to hold an auction for control 
of Paramount.
13   
Under the terms of the auction, Paramount asked each bidder to submit its best offer by 4:00 pm, 
December 20.  Both bidders would begin simultaneous tender offers.  Although Paramount would 
endorse one of the two bids, the shareholders' tender decisions ultimately would decide the winner. The 
bidders would be allowed to revise their offers any time within ten business days. The auction would end 
when one bidder obtained tenders of more than 51% of Paramount's shares. Paramount also required that 
the winning offer remain open for 10 days after being declared the winner in the initial tender round, so 
that shares tendered to the losing bidder could be withdrawn and tendered to the winner.
14  Paramount set 
February 1 as the absolute final deadline for bids and counterbids -- after this date, the bidders would be 
allowed no further changes to their bids. 
On December 20, Viacom and QVC each submitted acquisition proposals to the Paramount 
Board. These are described in Table 2.  A day later, Paramount's Board received the written opinion of 
Lazard Freres, stating that QVC's current plan was fair to Paramount stockholders and was superior to 
Viacom's current offer.  Based on this opinion, Paramount signed a merger agreement with QVC.  
Nevertheless, the bidding continued. 
On January 7, 1994, Viacom announced a $9.4 billion merger with Blockbuster Entertainment, 
and consequently, a new bid for Paramount.  The market's reaction to these events clearly reflected the 
consensus that both firms were overpaying for Paramount.  The probability of Viacom winning control 
                                                                 
13 The Chancery Court opinion did not force Paramount to undertake an auction.  It merely held Paramount’s board 
to a higher standard of scrutiny when considering a merger offer. They would not be in breach of their duties as long 
as they made a merger decision based on evidence that allowed them to judge all offers on equal footing. 
14 Wall Street Journal, December 15, 1993.   21 
increased;  Viacom A shares fell from $47 per share to $46 1/8 while B shares fell from $41 to $38.25.  
Meanwhile the probability of QVC winning declined; QVC shares increased by $1 1/8 to $40.625.  At the 
same time, Paramount stock price rose $.75 per share. 
 
D.  The Final Bids 
On January 12, Lazard Freres issued an opinion that QVC's offer was both fair to Paramount 
stockholders and superior to Viacom's offer.  On January 18, Viacom again increased the cash portion of 
its bid, and amended the terms of the second-step merger to provide for the exchange of (i) 0.93065 
shares of Viacom Class B Common Stock, (ii) 0.30408 shares of Viacom Merger Preferred Stock, (iii) 
0.93065 Contingent Valuation Rights (CVRs)
 15, and (iv) 0.5 Viacom Three-Year Warrants for each 
Paramount share remaining after consummation of the offer. On January 21, Lazard Freres opined that 
both the QVC and Viacom offers were fair, but that the Viacom offer was marginally superior to the QVC 
offer. 
Finally, on February 1, both Viacom and QVC submitted their final proposals for Paramount.  
Table 3 outlines these proposals.  Viacom offered $107 per share in cash for 50.1% of Paramount's 
shares, and increased the offer for each remaining Paramount share in a second-step merger to (i) 0.93065 
shares of Viacom Class B Common Stock, (ii) 0.93065 CVRs, (iii) 0.5 Viacom Three-Year Warrants, (iv) 
0.3 Viacom Five-Year Warrants and (v) $17.50 in principal amount of Viacom Merger Debentures with 
an 8% coupon and 12 year maturity if the Blockbuster-Viacom merger was approved.  If the merger was 
not approved, the debentures would be replaced with $17.50 face value of Viacom preferred stock with a 
5% dividend yield. 
Meanwhile, QVC increased its offer to $104 per share in cash for 50.1% of Paramount's shares 
and (i) 1.2361 shares of QVC Common Stock, (ii) 0.2386 shares of New QVC Merger Preferred Stock, 
and (iii) 0.32 ten-year warrants for each remaining Paramount share in a second-step merger.
16 
                                                                 
15 The Contingent Valuation Rights (CVRs) are described in greater detail in Appendix A. 
16 In each case, individual securities within the package could be sold separately.   22 
On February 15, Viacom was declared the winner when over 50% of Paramount’s shares were 
tendered to Viacom’s offer.  By that time, Viacom B (A) shares had declined to $28.00 ($34.125) per 
share; QVC had risen to $50.25 per share; and Paramount traded at $77.00 per share. 
 
IV.  Determining Overpayment and Relative Synergy in the Paramount Contest
17 
The structure of Paramount’s auction corresponds closely to our Category I takeover with two 
bidders.  The dates from February 2 to February 14 represent potential time 2’s in our analysis.  February 
1 was the last date that the bidders could revise their bids.  The deadline was after the market close.  
Therefore, beginning on February 2: final bids were set; investors were arguably virtually certain that one 
of the two bidders would acquire Paramount; but investors were uncertain which bidder would prevail.  
All of the other dates between February 2 and February 15 also are consistent with time 2 in our analysis.  
In this section, we attempt to estimate the degree to which Viacom overpaid, and determine whether 
Viacom or QVC had greater synergies with Paramount. 
Using the methodology of section 3, the stock prices for the target and the two bidders as of 
February 2 (or the dates from February 2 to February 14) yield a system of three equations in five 
unknowns. The five unknowns are: (1) the probability of Viacom's success, q
A; (2) the value of Viacom if 
it wins, A
A; (3) if it loses, A
N; (4) the value of QVC if it wins, B
B; and (5) the value of QVC if it loses, 
B
N.  The value of Viacom if it wins, and QVC if it loses are revealed by the outcome of the auction (as 
$28.00 and $50.25).  We use these actual market prices as proxies of the market's expectation before the 




We begin by reproducing the equations from section 3.1.2: 
A2    =    q
A A
A + (1 - q
A) A
N  
 B2    =    q
A B
N + (1 - q
A) B
B  
 T2    =    q
A O
A(A




                                                                 
17 In the analyses in this section, we do not include adjustments for market movements because the S&P 500 was 
relatively stable over the first two weeks of February 1994 as well as from September 7, 1993 to February 15, 1994.  
Including such adjustments would not affect any of our results.   23 
A.  Valuing the Viacom and QVC offers 
The analysis is complicated by the fact that the offers Viacom and QVC gave to Paramount are 
non-linear functions of the Viacom and QVC stock prices conditional on their winning the contest.  We 




B).   
Viacom's final offer contained a mix of three-year warrants, five-year warrants, debt or preferred, 
cash, equity, and CVRs.  Based on the closing price of Viacom’s B shares on February 3, Lazard Freres’ 
valued the offer at $83.31 – $53.61 in cash, $8.41 in debt, $15.79 in common stock, and $5.49 in warrant 
and CVR value.
18  This compares to the initial offer in September of $69.14 of which only $9.10 was in 
cash.  The analyses are presented in table 4.   
QVC's consisted of a package of cash, preferred stock, QVC common stock and warrants.  Based 
on the closing price of QVC’s shares on February 3, Lazard Freres’ valued the offer at $86.72 – $52.10 in 
cash, $3.76 in preferred stock, $28.30 in common stock, and $2.55 in warrant value.
19  This compares to 
the initial offer in September of $80.01 of which $30.00 was in cash.  The analyses also are presented in 
table 4.  
The Lazard analyses are inaccurate in two ways.  First, they rely on the Viacom and QVC stock 
prices that prevailed on February 3 (and in September for the initial offer), rather than their respective 
stock prices conditional on winning.  As Lazard Freres’ noted, the use of the prevailing stock prices was 
inappropriate, because those prices partially reflected the possibility that either bidder would not win the 
contest.  According to Lazard Freres, “the more relevant comparison is of the value of the winner’s bid 
versus the value at which the loser’s bid would theoretically have traded had it prevailed … More 
importantly, with the bidding process that has been established, Paramount’s shareholders (who are 
                                                                 
18 The warrant and CVR values are based on volatilities of 35% and 45%, respectively.  This analysis also assumes 
the Blockbuster merger is approved.  Lazard estimated a value of $81.49 if the Blockbuster merger was not 
approved. 
19 The warrant value is based on a volatility of 25%.    24 
largely sophisticated institutions, including arbitragers) continue to have the ability to choose between the 
two proposals based on their views of value.”
20 
Second, Lazard Freres valued both the first and second stages of the offers as if they were going 
to occur immediately.  In fact, the cash portion of the winning offer would not be paid until the tender 
offer expired.  This was to occur two weeks after a winner was declared.  The non-common stock-based, 
non-cash portion of the winning offer would not be paid until shareholders approved the offer.  This 
would be expected to occur three to four months after a winner was declared.
21   
In our calculations, we adjust for the two inaccuracies.  First, we treat the offer values for each 
company as a function of the value of the bidder’s stock conditional on winning, A
A and B
B.  Second, we 
discount the cash portion by 1% and the non-common stock-based, non-cash portion by 4% to reflect the 
fact that the shareholders would not receive the proceeds of the winning offer immediately.  This assumes 
a discount rate of 1% per month.  Our results are not sensitive to this assumption. 
 
B.  Inferring Unobserved Stock Prices 
We can now solve explicitly for overpayment and relative synergies.  As noted earlier, we assume 
that the actual values of Viacom and QVC on February 15 (time 3) when Viacom was declared the 
winner,  A
A ($28) and B
N ($50.25), are the values the market expected from February 2 until February 14 
(all potential time 2’s).  Similarly, we assume that the value of Viacom’s offer conditional on Viacom 
winning, O
A(A
A), equals Paramount’s value of $77.00 on February 15. 




Viacom B:    34.000  =  qAA
A + (1 - qA)A
N       =  28qA + (1 - qA)A
N 
 QVC:      45.875  =   qAB
N + (1 - qA)B
B       =  50.25qA + (1 - qA)B
B 
Paramount:    78.000  =   qA O
A(A
A) + (1 - qA) O
B(B




                                                                 
20 Paramount Communications 13E3, May 25, 1994. 
21 In fact, the cash portion was paid on March 1, 1994, and the non-cash portion was paid on July 6, 1994. 
22 In this analysis, we use the volatilities used by Lazard Freres to value the warrants in the QVC and Viacom offers.  
We have repeated the analysis across a wide range of volatility assumptions.  The results are qualitatively similar.   25 
We also solve the analogous system of equations for February 3 to February 14.   Panel A of table 
5 reports the results of this analysis, providing our estimates of qA, A
N, and B
B as well as actual closing 
share prices for Viacom, QVC, and Paramount from February 2 and February 15.   
The pattern in panel A of table 5 suggests that even in this case, the assumptions necessary to 
derive information are not perfectly satisfied.  On February 2, 3 and 9, we obtain the anomalous results 
that the market valued the QVC offer more highly than the Viacom offer yet imputed a higher probability 
to Viacom’s offer succeeding.  This is a function of the fact that Paramount’s stock closed at a price 
greater than $77 on these days.  One explanation for this anomaly is that on those days, the market valued 
the Viacom offer somewhat more highly than the $77 we have assumed.   
The other anomalous results are for February 14 where we cannot obtain plausible estimates 
because the equations imply a negative value for QVC conditional on QVC winning.  This result occurs 
(mechanically) because the likelihood of Viacom winning was very high on February 14, yet Paramount’s 
stock price closed below $77.00 at $76.125.   
Although the instability of these results is problematic, it is the case that the results are fairly 
stable and plausible from February 4 to February 11.  The estimated values of Viacom and QVC 
conditional on QVC winning vary, respectively, from $41.98 to $47.53 and from $30.27 to 34.65.  In the 
analysis in the following section, we use the average of these values of $44.62 and $32.00 over those six 
days. 
In panel B, we make an alternative assumption that the market valued both the Viacom offer and 
the QVC offer at $77.00 per share over the entire period from February 2 to February 15.   The rationale 
for this assumption is that the two offers were perceived to be very close in value by both the investment 
bankers and the market.  If this assumption had truly been the case, Paramount’s stock price would have 
remained at $77 for the entire period.  Nevertheless, we use this assumption for two reasons.  First, except 
for February 2, 3, and 14, Paramount’s actual closing price is within $0.50 of $77.00.  Second, the 
resulting probabilities and estimated prices are smoother and non-anomalous from February 4 onward.   26 
Under the second set of assumptions, panel B estimates the value of QVC conditional on QVC 
winning as $33.07.  The estimated probability that Viacom would win increases monotonically from 
February 4 onward.  The estimated value of Viacom conditional on QVC winning starts above $50 on 
February 2 and 3, declines to the low $40 range from February 4 to February 8, and then stays in the mid-
$40 range from February 9 to February 14.  In the analysis that follows, we use the average Viacom value 
from February 4 to February 14 of $44.13. 
In sum, the results in table 5 are mixed.  The patterns are not consistent with the assumptions 
needed to make a definitive inference of overpayment and relative synergies.  On the other hand, the 
estimates of the values of Viacom and QVC conditional on QVC winning are qualitatively similar over 
many days and under different assumptions.  In the following section, we utilize these estimates to infer 
overpayment and relative synergies, acknowledging that they are potentially imperfect. 
 
C.  Solving for Overpayment and Relative Synergies 
We can now use equations 1A – 1E to estimate the values of overpayment, relative synergy, and 
new information.  Table 6 reports our results.  Because they are qualitatively identical for each of the two 
sets of assumptions, we will discuss the results in panel A.  Based on the results and assumptions in panel 
A of table 5, and the average values from February 4 to February 11, we assume: A
N, the value of Viacom 
B if QVC wins, equal to $44.62;  A
A, the value of Viacom B if Viacom wins, equals $28; B
N, the value of 
QVC if Viacom wins, equals $50.25; and B
B, the value of QVC if QVC wins, equals $32.   
The analysis also requires an assumption concerning the value of Viacom A.  Viacom A traded at 
$34.25 on February 15, corresponding to the value of Viacom A if Viacom wins.  This is 1.22 times the 
value of Viacom B.  To calculate the value of Viacom A if QVC wins, we multiply the estimate of 
Viacom B if QVC wins of $44.62 to obtain $54.58.
23 
                                                                 
23 This implied premium for the A shares of 22% exceeds the premium for the A shares before the takeover contest 
began and during most of the contest.  Our results are qualitatively identical assuming the average premium during 
the contest of 11%.   27 
These estimates imply that both Viacom and QVC were willing to overpay by large amounts.  
Viacom overpaid by more than $2.0 billion.  Similarly, the estimates imply that QVC would also have 
overpaid by a smaller, but still substantial $688 million. 
Table 6 also shows that the market believed that the synergies of a QVC-Paramount combination 
substantially exceeded those of the Viacom-Paramount combination that occurred.   While it is not 
possible to infer actual synergies, because we do not observe the stand-alone value of Paramount, T
N, it is 
possible to infer relative synergies.  Table 6 reports that the expected QVC-Paramount synergies 
exceeded those expected in the Viacom-Paramount merger by over $1.4 billion.  Viacom won the 
takeover contest because it was willing to overpay (relative to market expectations) by much more than 
QVC was.   
We can compare actual synergies only if we are willing to assume a standalone value for 
Paramount.  One possibility is to assume that the standalone value of Paramount did not change over the 
course of the contest, remaining at the $55.875 per share Paramount traded at on September 7, 1993.  This 
seems plausible given that the shares of the four other most prominent companies in the industry – News 
Corp., Time Warner, Turner Broadcasting, and Walt Disney – were relatively stable over this period, 
increasing by an average of 2.4% from September 7 to February 15.   If we include (the new information 
revealed about) Viacom and QVC in the industry, the average return is –5.3% for the six companies from 
September 7 to February 15.  Under the assumption of no change in standalone value, the estimates imply 
synergies of $0.34 billion with Viacom and $1.76 billion with QVC.  It appears, therefore, that the market 
assumed there were minor synergies to the Viacom combination and more substantial synergies to the 
QVC combination.  
Finally, table 6 reports the new information revealed about both firms through the course of the 
takeover battle.  Based on the stock prices on September 7, 1993, before the first takeover announcement,   28 
the stand-alone value of QVC has fallen by $481 million.  In comparison, Viacom’s stand-alone value 
experienced a decline of more than $1.7 billion.
24 
 
D.  Postscript 
In the three years following the acquisition, Viacom’s stock price continued to perform poorly.  
From February 15, 1994 to February 28, 1997, Viacom B increased in value by 24%.  Over the same 
period, the S&P increased by 71% and Viacom’s three primary competitors (Disney, News Corp. and 
Time Warner) increased by 25%.  These results do not indicate that the market reacted inaccurately and 
do not support Redstone’s view that Viacom and Paramount had great synergies.   
When we extend the analysis to five years after the acquisition (to February 28, 1999), Viacom 
and Redstone do somewhat better.  From February 15, 1994 to February 28, 1999, Viacom B increased in 
value by 211%.  Over that same period, the S&P increased by 160% and Viacom’s three primary 
competitors increased by 141%.  While these results are consistent with the market overestimating 
Viacom’s overpayment and underestimating synergies, the industry returns still imply that Viacom 
overpaid by almost $1 billion.
25 
 
E.  Implications 
We find evidence of a stunning overpayment of more than $2.0 billion for Viacom as well as 
almost $0.7 billion for QVC.  Sumner Redstone’s willingness to overpay is striking given his ownership 
position in Viacom.  Redstone owned 45.5 million of Viacom A shares and 46.6 million of Viacom B 
shares.  Before the Blockbuster transaction, these holdings represented, 85% and 69%, respectively, of the 
two classes of stock.  Overall, therefore, Redstone controlled 76% of Viacom’s cash flow rights and 85% 
                                                                 
24  If Paramount’s stand-alone value, like those of Viacom and QVC, fell over this period, then the actual synergies 
would be greater than those calculated in the previous paragraph. 
25 This discounts Viacom’s stock price in February 1999 by the industry return of 141% to get a Viacom B value of 
$36.67 rather than $28.00.  This is almost $8 less than the estimate of Viacom B without overpayment of $44.62.   29 
of Viacom’s voting rights (the B shares did not have any voting rights) when the takeover contest began.  
In this section, we consider different explanations or theories to explain these results. 
We believe our results have two possible (and not mutually exclusive) interpretations.  The first 
interpretation is that Redstone’s beliefs were very different from those of the market.  This particular 
contest and results are consistent with some of the arguments in Roll (1986).  According to Roll (1986), 
acquirers overpay because they “mistakenly convince themselves that the market does not reflect the full 
economic value of the combined firm.”  Heaton (2002) and Malmendier and Tate (2002) make similar 
arguments in financing and investment contexts.   
Redstone’s actions as well as Diller’s are consistent with this explanation.  In Redstone’s case, 
overconfidence / hubris also might logically have followed from the great success Viacom and he had 
enjoyed to that point.  With a net worth of over $5 billion, Redstone was one of the wealthiest men in the 
world.  Redstone’s earlier acquisition of Viacom in a leveraged buyout was the source of much of that 
wealth. 
Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis assumes that managers are acting in what they believe are the 
best interests of shareholders.  It also is possible that managers obtain private, non-pecuniary benefits 
from control and acquisitions that do not benefit shareholders.  The second interpretation, therefore, is 
that Redstone received large private (and non-pecuniary) benefits from the acquisition.  Such managers 
may knowingly overpay if the private benefits of doing so outweigh the pecuniary costs.  Theoretically, 
private benefit consumption decreases as managers own a larger share of a firm’s cash flows (or equity).  
At some point, however, as management obtains effective voting control, managers may be able to 
increase private benefit consumption.
26  Morck, Shleifer, Vishny (1988) describe this tradeoff and find 
evidence for it. 
In the case of Paramount, Redstone’s behavior is at least consistent with the arguments in Fama 
and Jensen (1983) and Morck et al. (1988).  Redstone controlled a majority of the voting rights of Viacom 
                                                                 
26 E.g., see Fama and Jensen (1983). 
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and, therefore, could choose to overpay if the private benefits were sufficient.  Perhaps he wanted to be 
the “king of all media.”  It is worth emphasizing, however, that for private benefits to be the only 
explanation, Redstone must have obtained over $1.5 billion in private or non-pecuniary benefits to justify 
his bid (given that he controlled 76% of Viacom’s cash flow rights). 
A third, but in this case, less convincing explanation is that given in Shleifer and Vishny (2001).  
In their model, companies with overvalued stock make acquisitions with that stock.  Because the market 
does not completely recognize the overvaluation at the time of the acquisition, such bidders succeed in 
making acquisitions with overvalued stock.  In the medium and long run, the bidder stock price declines 
as the market discovers the overvaluation.    
Viacom’s and Redstone’s initial offer for Paramount is potentially consistent with the Shleifer 
and Vishny (2001) theory.  The Viacom stock in Viacom’s initial offer made up roughly 87% of the 
initial $69.14 value for each Paramount share.  At the time, Viacom enjoyed the highest market 
capitalization to operating cash flow ratio of any of its competitors.  (See Kaplan (1994a)).  Complicating 
this interpretation, however, is the fact that Viacom engaged in open market repurchases of B shares 
throughout the summer of 1993 – the period before the initial offer. 
As we have seen, the initial offer was not successful.  Instead, the stock and warrants in Viacom’s 
final and successful offer comprised less than 14% of the total $77 value for each Paramount share.  
Furthermore, Viacom’s stock does not appear to have been particularly overvalued relative to Viacom’s 
primary competitors over the ensuing three years nor relative to the entire market over the ensuing five 
years.  In other words, it does not appear that Viacom and Redstone succeeded in issuing overvalued 
equity to pay for Paramount. 
Finally, it is worth stressing that the results are not consistent with a classical agency or incentive 
problem.
27  Given Redstone’s large ownership stake in Viacom, it seems implausible that even greater 
equity incentives would have caused him to change his behavior. 
                                                                 
27 See Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
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Overall, then, the most compelling explanations involve some combination of overconfidence and 
private benefits.  Because the two are not mutually exclusive, it is not possible to distinguish between 
them.  It is possible to conclude, however, that our analysis indicates that the combination of 
overconfidence and private benefits exceeded $1.5 billion. 
   
V.  Summary and Implications 
This paper analyzes the amount of information that can be extracted from stock prices around 
takeover contests.  In the first part of the paper, we show that it is not possible in general to use target and 
bidder stock price movements to infer the market's estimates of synergies, bidder overpayment, and 
changes in bidder and target values.  In two generic cases, however, we show that it is possible to use 
bidder and target stock prices to obtain market estimates of overpayments and synergies.  One occurs 
when a sole bidder mounts an unsuccessful takeover attempt; the other occurs when the acquisition 
contest includes exactly two bidders. 
In the second part of the paper, we illustrate one of these two generic cases through a study of the 
takeover contest for Paramount.  Our calculations suggest that the market estimated that Viacom, the 
“winner" of the takeover battle, overpaid by more than $2 billion when it agreed to purchase Paramount.  
This overpayment occurred despite the fact that Sumner Redstone, the CEO of Viacom, owned roughly 
two-thirds of Viacom.  We view the results for Paramount and Viacom to be consistent with a 
combination overconfidence / hubris and private benefits for Redstone.  The combination of 
overconfidence and private benefits exceeded $1.5 billion. 
The empirical portion of our paper also illuminates the theoretical work of Bebchuk and Hart 
(2001) who analyze the benefits and shortcomings of various mechanisms for replacing incumbent 
managers.  As they point out, one of the benefits of tender offers is that they encourage the bidder to pass 
along some of its private benefits to existing shareholders in order to tempt them to accept their offer.  
Paramount's takeover auction did exactly this: it encouraged both bidders to increase the cash portions of 
their offers, signaling to existing shareholders that theirs was the deal with greater synergies.  In the two   32 
weeks between the close of bidding and the declaration of the auction's winner, the market continually 
reset prices of the two bidders as market participants sought to simultaneously determine the probability 
of each firm winning, and consequently, other market participants' revised valuations of the bidders' 
offers.  Thus, our case illustrates a situation in which market participants face difficulty in determining 
the value of an offer precisely because they do not know which firm will win the auction.   33 
Appendix A 
Contingent Value Rights 
 
The Contingent Value Rights (CVRs) can be viewed as Asian put spreads (where  SV is the 
average stock price of Viacom B shares over a 20-day period one year after the merger).  If the options 
expired in one year, then the payoff on the CVRs would be the difference between $48 and the Viacom B 
price up to a max of $12.  This is: 
CVR    =    max[min (48 - SV, 12) , 0],   or:   
CVR    =    max(48 - SV, 0) - max(36 - SV, 0).  
 
The CVRs were designed to signal Redstone’s belief that substantial synergies existed between 
Paramount and Viacom.  With low or no synergies, Viacom’s stock could be expected to decline and the 
CVRs would be increasingly costly (up to $12 per share).  Alternatively, if the synergies were great, 
Viacom’s stock could be expected to rise and the CVRs would be worthless.   
The CVRs contained a delayed exercise option that complicates their valuation. The delayed 
exercise feature gave Viacom the right, at the end of the first year, to extend the CVRs for an additional 
year.  But by delaying payment, the spread would widen to $14, as the CVRs’ payoff would become max 
(51 - SV, 0) - max(37 - SV, 0).  This, in turn, could be delayed for another year, widening the spread 
further to $17 with an upper-bound stock price of $55.   
The analysis that follows discusses the Monte Carlo valuation technique we used in the presence 
of embedded options.  The Lazard-Frères (L-F) analysis assumes that it is never optimal for the issuer to 
exercise the CVRs embedded options, therefore L-F prices the CVR with Black-Scholes.  This 
assumption is only valid when special conditions on the risk-free rate and volatilities are satisfied.
28  
                                                                 
28 The condition is that at time t=1, the payoff of the then-expiring $48 put spread must, for all stock prices, be less 
than that of the one-year $51 put spread.  (In order for this payoff to be valued under Black-Scholes, an analogous 
condition must hold at t=2.) 
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We price the CVR taking into account that for certain realized stock prices at t=1,2, it may be 
optimal for the issuer to exercise the rollover feature.
29  Thus, the set of payoffs that can arise under 
certain contingencies can be written as follows: 
 
Time    Current Payoff    Rollover  
t = 2   max(51-S2,0) - max(37-S2,0)   E2(max(54-S3,0) - max(38-S3,0))  
t = 1   max(48-S1,0) - max(36-S1,0)  E1(max(51-S2,0) - max(37-S2,0)) 
t = 0   E0(max(48-S1,0) - max(36-S1,0))  - 
 
To obtain a price for the CVRs, we proceed in three steps: 
1.  Using the current stock price, current risk-free rate, and historical volatility of Viacom, we 
simulate a distribution of future stock prices at t=2.  Under this distribution, we calculate 
(pointwise) the payoffs to closing the position at t=2 or rolling over the CVR for an additional 
year.  We then obtain the minimum of these two alternatives and  discount this inner payoff 
envelope back to t=1 at the risk-free rate prevailing at t=1. 
 
2.  At t=1 we compare the payoffs to closing out the position to those described above.  If it was 
never optimal to exercise the embedded rollover option at t=2, then we compare the Black-
Scholes price of a one-year, 14-pt. put spread at $54 to closing out a 12-pt. put spread 
immediately.  As before, the inner payoff envelope is obtained. 
 
3.  The inner payoff envelope calculated at t=1 is discounted back to t=0, the initiation date of the 
CVRs.  The CVR price at t=0 is then the mean value of this distribution of discounted payoffs.  If 
it was never optimal to exercise the delay option at t=1, then this is replaced with the Black-
Scholes price of a 12-pt. put spread at $51. 
 
This process is repeated up to ten thousand times, and the arithmetic average is obtained over the 
entire set of draws.   The key parameters in this exercise are the risk-free rate at each decision node and 
the stock price volatility for Viacom. Based on the zero-coupon yield curve prevailing on February 1, 
1994, we inferred one-year forward rates at one and two years.  For volatility, we used the value 45% 
assumed in the L-F analysis of the offer.
                                                                 
29 Throughout the appendix, t=2 denotes the time at which the second rollover option is evaluated by the CVR 
issuer, while t=1 denotes the time at which the first CVR rollover is evaluated.   35 
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Table I 
Summary of takeover classification 
This table summarizes the results of section 3 classifying takeovers based on how much information can be 
extracted from stock prices surrounding the takeover event.  In Category I, investors know that one of the 
bidders will acquire the firm.  In Category II, investors know that there is positive probability that the target 
will remain a stand-alone company.  Category IIA occurs when the target is taken over.  Category IIB 
occurs when it is not. “Comparative” synergies implies that while it is not possible to solve for the actual 
synergies in the acquisition, it is possible to see which bidder-target combination offered higher synergies. 
 Category I   Category II  # of   
bidders 
 Type of  
 Information       Category IIA     Category IIB  
1   Synergies?    -    -    Yes  
    Overpayments?   -    -    Yes  
2   Synergies?   Comparative     -    -  
    Overpayments?   Yes    -    -  
>2    Synergies?   -     -    -  
    Overpayments?   -    -    -  
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Table II 
Time line of events in QVC, Viacom, and Paramount takeover contest 
 
This table displays the sequence of alternating bids in the takeover contest for Paramount from September 1993 to 
February 1994.  The two-step merger plans describe a price per share paid for the initial 51% of shares outstanding, 
and then conditional on the success of the tender offer, a plan for the remaining 49% of shares outstanding.  The 
details surrounding the warrants of both firms, Viacom's convertible preferred stock, and its contingent value rights 
(CVRs) are explained in table 3. 
Date    Viacom     QVC  
September 13, 1993    Initial Bid:    
  $9.10 in Cash    
  .1 Shares Viacom A    
  .9 Shares Viacom B    
September 20, 1993      Initial Hostile Bid: 
     $30 in Cash 
     .893 shares QVC Common 




First Step:  50.1% @ $80/share  
Second Step:  .20 shares Viacom A, 1.083 
shares Viacom B, 
.20 shares Convertible Preferred  
First Step:  50.1% Shares @ $80;  
Second Step:  1.43 shares  
   
November 5, 1993   Amended Counter Offer:    
  First Step:  50.1% @ $85/share    
  1.083 shares Viacom B      
  .30 shares Convertible Preferred     
November 12, 1993      Second Tender Offer: 
     First Step:  50.1% Shares @ $90;  
     Second Step:  1.43 Shares,  
     .32 Convertible preferred 
November 15, 1993   Paramount rejects QVC's Bid as too conditional 
December 9, 1993   Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Chancery Court Ruling Favoring QVC 
December 20, 1993      Third QVC Offer 
     First Step:  50.1% Shares @ $92;  
     Second Step:  1.43 Shares,  
     .32 non-convertible preferred 
     .32 10-Yr. QVC Warrants 
January 7, 1994   Third Viacom Offer    
  First Step:  50.1% @ $105;   
  Second Step:  .93 shares Viacom B      
  .30 shares Convertible Preferred     
January 18, 1994   Fourth Viacom Offer    
  First Step:  50.1% @ $107;   
  Second Step:  .93 shares Viacom B      
  .93 Contingent Value Rights (see Table III    
   .30 shares Convertible Preferred     
   .5 3-Yr. Warrants     
February 1, 1994    Final Bid: See table 3  Final Bid: See table 3 
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Table III 
Final offers submitted by QVC and Viacom  
 
This table describes the final offers for Paramount submitted by Viacom and QVC as of February 1, 1994. 
 
QVC 
Cash of $104 per share for 50.1% of Paramount shares.   
A securities package for the rest.  For each of the remaining 49.9% Paramount shares: 
•  1.2361 shares of QVC Common Stock. 
•  0.2386 shares of QVC (non-convertible) Preferred Stock. Each share has $50 liquidation value and 
pays an annual dividend of 6% or $3 per share.  In three years, the shares may be exchanged, at the 
option of QVC, for junior subordinated debentures. 
•  0.32 of a ten-year warrant to buy QVC shares with a strike price of $70.34. 
 
Viacom  
Cash of $107 per share for 50.1% of shares 
A securities package for the rest.  For each of the remaining 49.9% Paramount shares: 
•  0.93065 of Viacom B Common Shares. 
•  0.5 of a three-year Viacom B American Call Warrants with a strike price of $60. 
•  0.3 of a five-year Viacom B American Call Warrants with a strike price of $70. 
•  $17.50 principal amount of a subordinated debenture with a coupon rate of 8% and a maturity of 12 
years.  The debentures were non-callable for 5 years assuming Viacom and Blockbuster merge.  If the 
merger was not approved by Blockbuster shareholders, the subordinated debenture would be replaced 
with $17.50 face value of Viacom preferred stock with a dividend yield of 5%. 
•  0.93065 of a Contingent Value Right (CVR): 
•  After one year, Viacom can pay each CVR in cash or Viacom securities the difference between 
$48 and the average closing prices of Viacom Class B stock over each twenty trading days over 
the 60 days prior to the one year maturity, up to $12 per share.  In other words, if the average price 
of Viacom Class B is less than $48 per share, each CVR pays the lesser of  ($48  - Via B) or $12. 
•  At the one year maturity, Viacom can, if it chooses, extend the CVR an addition year (for a total 
maturity of two years).  If Viacom does so, it must pay the difference between $51 (not $48) and 
the average closing prices up to a maximum of $14 (not $12) per share.  Finally at the two year 
maturity, Viacom can extend the CVR for one last year, after which Viacom must pay the 
difference between $55 and the average closing prices up to a maximum of $17 per share. 
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Table IV 
Value of initial and final bids using prevailing stock prices 
 
Value of Viacom offers on September 12, 1993 and on February 3, 1994, and QVC offers on September 
20, 1993 and February 3, 1994 using closing stock prices on the respective dates.  The value of the final 
Viacom offer assumes the Blockbuster merger occurs.  Sources:  Lazard Freres presentation to Paramount 
Board in Paramount Communications 13E3, May 25, 1994. 
 
Viacom's Initial Offer, September 12, 1993 
$9.10 in cash     $9.10  
0.1 shares of Viacom A    $6.60  
0.9 shares of Viacom B    $53.44  
Total      $69.14 
 
QVC's Hostile Bid, September 20th, 1993 
$30.00 in cash    $30.00  
.893 QVC shares    $50.01  
Total    $80.01 
 
Viacom's Final Offer: February 3, 1994 
Security           Value      Ratio     Amount     Per Share  
    Cash                107.00    0.501    1.000     53.61  
    Subordinated Debt      0.96    0.499    17.50       8.41  
    CVR                    8.33     0.499    0.931       3.87  
    Warrant - 3 year       3.28     0.499    0.500       0.82  
    Warrant - 5 year       5.48     0.499    0.300       0.82 
    Common               34.00    0.499    0.931     15.79  
Total           83.31 
 
QVC's Final Offer: February 3, 1994 
    Cash                 104.00    0.501    1.000     52.10  
    Preferred              31.53     0.499    0.239       3.76  
    Warrant - 10 year      15.97     0.499    0.320       2.55  
    Common                 45.875    0.499    1.236     28.30  
Total            86.71 
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Table V 
Time series of Viacom stock prices, QVC stock prices, and implied Viacom success probabilities 
 
This table uses trading prices for Viacom and QVC to infer the market's estimate of Viacom's success probability, the value of Viacom in QVC wins, and the 
value of QVC if QVC wins.  The calculations assume that the closing prices on February 15, 1994 for Viacom and QVC ($28 and $50.25, respectively) proxy for 
the market's expectation of these values at each date from February 2 to February 14.  Similarly, the calculations also assume that the value of the Viacom offer 
for Paramount equals the value of Paramount on February 15 – $77 – from February 2 to February 14.   In panel A, this creates a system of three equations and 
three unknowns (Equation 5 in the text) that are solved for each date.  In panel B, the value of the QVC offer is fixed at $77.00 which fixes the value of QVC if 
QVC wins at $33.07 per share.  This creates a system of two equations in two unknowns that are solved for each date. 
 
 
  Panel A:  Panel B: 
  Actual Prices: 
































                           
Feb. 02   $46.750  $33.500   $78.000  0.715  $47.31  $37.96  $77.00  $80.49  0.796  $55.00  $33.07  $77.00  $77.00 
Feb. 03   $45.875  $34.000  $78.125  0.654  $45.34  $37.61  $77.00  $80.23  0.745  $51.56  $33.07  $77.00  $77.00 
Feb. 04   $43.875  $32.875  $76.500   0.671  $42.80  $30.89  $77.00  $75.46  0.629  $41.14  $33.07  $77.00  $77.00 
Feb. 07   $45.125  $32.375  $76.500   0.744  $45.06  $30.27  $77.00  $75.03  0.702  $42.67  $33.07  $77.00  $77.00 
Feb. 08   $45.125  $31.875  $76.750  0.723  $41.98  $31.76  $77.00  $76.08  0.702  $40.99  $33.07  $77.00  $77.00 
Feb. 09   $45.125  $33.250  $77.375  0.671  $43.98  $34.65  $77.00  $78.12  0.702  $45.60  $33.07  $77.00  $77.00 
Feb. 10   $45.625  $32.750  $76.875  0.742  $46.38  $32.35  $77.00  $76.49  0.731  $45.64  $33.07  $77.00  $77.00 
Feb. 11   $46.875  $31.625  $76.875  0.814  $47.53  $32.06  $77.00  $76.29  0.804  $46.45  $33.07  $77.00  $77.00 
Feb. 14   $48.500   $29.875  $76.125  N.A.  N.A.  < 0.00  $77.00  N.A.  0.898  $46.41  $33.07  $77.00  $77.00 
Feb. 15   $50.250  $28.000  $77.000  1.00    N.A.  N.A.  $77.00  N.A.  1.000  N.A.  N.A.  $77.00  N.A.   42 
Table VI  
Analysis of overpayments and synergies 
Estimates of overpayments and synergies in the Viacom - QVC - Paramount takeover contest.  QVC share price had QVC won and Viacom Class B share price 
had Viacom lost are the average of their respective values from February 4 to February 11, 1994 reported in table 5 for panel A and from February 4 to February 
14 for panel B.  Viacom Class A share price had Viacom lost is calculated to equal 1.22 times the Viacom Class B share price, the same ratio as 34.25 to 28.00.  
T
N denotes the value of Paramount (the target) as a stand-alone firm, i.e. if no acquisition had occurred.  We also report total synergies assuming that 
Paramount’s value, T
N, is equal to its value of $55.875 per share on September 7, 1993.  Total values of overpayments and relative synergies are based on 120M 
shares outstanding of Viacom stock (67M class B, 53M class A), 120M shares outstanding of Paramount stock, and 37.7M shares outstanding of QVC stock.  
New information revealed for each firm is calculated using September 7, 1993 prices for Viacom Class A of $66.25 per share, Viacom Class B of $59.25 per 
share, and QVC of $63.00.   
 
 
    Panel A:  Panel B: 
 
QVC 
(1)   QVC Share Price, Had It Won  $32.00  $33.07 
(2)   Prevailing Share Price, 2/15/94, Having Lost  $50.25  $50.25 
(3)   Offer Value, at $32.00 per share   $76.24  $77.00 
(4)   Overpayment:  [(2)-(1)] x 37.7 M  $688 M  $648 M 
(5)  Total QVC-Paramount Synergies:  (3) x 120 M – (4) - T
N  $8,461 M - T
N  $8,592 M - T
N 
(5’)  Total QVC-Paramount Synergies if T
N = T
0   $1,756 M  $1,887 M 
(6)  New Information Revealed Since Sept. 7:  
[(2) - $63.0] x 37.7 M 
 
- $481 M 
 
- $481 M 
 
Viacom  
    Class A  Class B  Class A  Class B 
(1)   Prevailing Share Price, 2/15/94, Having Won  $34.25  $28.00  $34.25  $28.00 
(2)   Viacom Share Price, Had It Lost   $54.58  $44.62  $53.98  $44.13 
(3)   Offer Value, at $28.00 per share   $77.00  $77.00 
(4)   Overpayment:   





(5)  Total Viacom -Paramount Synergies:  (3) x 120M – (4) - T
N  $7,049 M - T
N  $7,113 M - T
N 
(5’)  Total Viacom -Paramount Synergies if T
N = T
0   $ 344 M  $ 409 M 
(6)  New Information Revealed Since Sept. 7: 
[(2A) - $66.25] x 53M A + [(2B) - $59.25] x 67 M B 
 
- $1,599 M 
 
- $1,663 M 
 
 